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Abstract 
OnAugust24,I970, Senator J. William Fulbright presented 
the speech "Old Myths and New Realities 11: The Middle East" 
to the United States Senate. The intent of this paper is to uncover 
the sign)ficant implications of Senator Fulbright's delivery of 
this particular speech at this particular moment in American 
History. In brief, Fulbright proposed a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Israel, whereby Israel would 
return the conquered Arab lands of the I967Warin exchange for 
military protection from the United States. The speech. when 
taken out of context, provides a fairly simple plan to initiate 
peace in the Middle East. However, in relation to the events of 
I969 and I970, and specifically to the increasing alliance of the 
Soviet Union and Egypt, the Fulbright Peace plan offered a 
solution not only to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also to the Cold 
War rivalry in the Middle East and to the perceived ineffectiveness 
of the United Nations. 
The cntcial timing of the release of "Old Myths and New 
Realities 11: The Middle East" reflected Fulbright's awareness 
that continued attacks between Israel and thefedayeen 
(Egyptian-trained Arab fighters) would inevitably draw the 
United States into war with the Soviet Union. Angered by a series 
of inadequately implemented peace initiatives resultingfrom the 
unstable relationship between the Administration and the State 
Department, Fulbright could remain silent no longer. Moreover, 
the method of release (the speech was published widely both 
domestically and abroad before it was delivered on the Senate 
floor) reflected Fulbright's growing frustrations with the 
dwindling influence of the United States Congress over foreign 
policy decisions. Unfortunately, the proposal was rejected 
immediately by Israel and ignored by the administration. 
However, it received significant attention from the media. 
Old Myths for New Realities 
On August 24,1970, Senator J. William Fulbright presented 
the speech "Old Myths and New Realities II: The Middle East" 
to the United States Senate. A lengthy thirty-seven pages, the 
speech offered a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
specifically to the increasing alliance of the Soviet Union and 
Egypt, an alliance that had peaked in the late summer months of 
1970. In brief, Fulbright proposed a bilateral treaty between the 
United States and Israel, whereby Israel would return the 
conqueredArablandsoftheSix-DayWar(l967)inexchangefor 
military protection from the United States. Moreover, the 
Fulbright Peace Plan, as it was called. would have to be accepted 
and guaranteed by the United Nations Security Council. The 
speech, when taken out of con!ext, provides a fairly simple plan 
to initiate peace in the Middle East. However, when examined 
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in relation to the long series of American foreign policy blunders 
in the Middle East, "Old Myths and New Realities ll" reflects the 
evolution of the Senator's thought on the conflict. The manner 
and timing of the speech· s release are significant factors in 
understanding the Senator· s aims and intentions, which included 
an explication of his philosophy regarding the role of Congress 
in foreign policy decision-making and an avowal of his 
dissatisfaction with the secrecy of the Nixon Administration. 
Fulbright's involvement in the Middle East stemmed 
primarily from his reaction to a succession of foreign-policy 
blunders that angered and frustrated him, the result of each 
blunder being an increased and alarming Soviet presence in the 
region. In 1950, the United States, taking a naive Atlanticist 
perspective, signed the Tripartite Declaration with Britain and 
France, in which each agreed to "prevent an arms race among the 
major local powers in the Middle East, in particular Egypt, Iraq, 
and Israel."1 The declaration ultimately backfired because the 
new, powerful Prime MinisterofEgypt 'Abd al-Nassir (Nasser), 
having knowledge of the agreement, turned to the Soviet Union 
for military aid. The military aid would prove necessary in the 
1956 Suez Crisis. In December of 1955, under the leadership of 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles offered $56 million to Egypt to fund the Aswan Dam 
project, part of Nasser's campaign to modernize the state. 
Nasser, hoping for a better offer from the Soviets, did not 
respond to Dulles. Aggravated, Dulles hastily withdrew the 
offer. In order to fund the Dam on his own, Nasser nationalized 
the Universal Suez Canal Company, startling theW estern allies. 
Desperate, the British and French joined the Israeli attack on the 
fedayeen (Egyptian-trained Arab fighters) that was already in 
progress. The Eisenhower Administrationcalledforanimmediate 
cease-fire; European influence in the region completely 
disintegrated. The Soviets, sensing an opportunity to extend 
their influence, offered to participate in the Aswan Dam project 
which "alarmed Washington officials.'01 Fulbright blamed Dulles 
for causing the conflict and called for an immediate Senate 
investigation. 
In 1970, the possibility of a superpower conflict in the 
Middle East reached a volatile level. The Soviet Union, by this 
time, had deployed 15,000 military personnel to Egypt. Nasser, 
now the recognized leader of the Arab Nationalist movement and 
founder of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, had begun a 
war of attrition along the Israeli-Egyptian border. In July, Israeli 
Prime Minister Golda Meir told President Nixon that Israel had 
installed SA-2 and SA-3 batteries along the border. The 
Administration panicked, realizing that the slightest sign of 
aggression by the Arabs could result in a direct confrontation 
between Israel and the Soviet forces that were now dominant in 
the Sinai. Within days of Meir' s warning, Israeli Phantom jets 
came under fire in the Canal Zone. Secretary of State William 
Rogers negotiated a cease-fire that began on August 7, 1970. 
However, on August 13, 1970, Israeli intelligence revealed that 
Nasser and the Soviets had moved additional weapons into the 
standstill zone. The United States had no evidence to prove that 
these movements had occurred because the State Department 
failed to order U-2 reconnaissance planes to photograph the area 
on the day that the cease-fire was implemented. Israel was 
outraged by the poor planning and grew increasingly desperate 
due to the lack of American action against these violations. The 
mistake increased the urgency of the Arab-Israeli conflict-one 
factor that prompted the Senator to make his most extensive 
commentary on the Middle East that August. 
Furthermore, Israel and Egypt, as part of the cease-fire 
compromise, agreed to enter into negotiations under the auspices 
of the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Gunnar 
Jarring. Fulbright did not want to see the Administration force 
a quick solution to the conflict, as had occurred in the aftermath 
of the Suez Crisis. Rather, the Senator believed in public 
discussion of major foreign policy decisions, and he believed 
that Congress provided the appropriate arena for this type of 
discussion. Thus, an elaborate effort to release the speech both 
in abstract form and in its entirety was undertaken by the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee staff (Fulbright served as chairman 
of the SFRC from 1959 until 1974). An advance copy was 
forwarded to Secretary of State Rogers with a personal note from 
the Senator that stated flatly, "I have just finished this. I hope it 
may be helpful to you. If not denounce it."3 A briefing was held 
for all major media, and excerpts of the speech ran in the 
Washington Post and the New York Times. The excerpts ran one 
day prior to the delivery of the speech on the Senate floor and two 
days prior to the start of the Jarring negotiations. Indeed, 
Fulbright intended to exert his influence and encourage a debate 
on all levels from the mass public, to the media, to the 
Administration. Fulbright's insistence that any further peace 
initiatives for the Middle East be discussed in Congress reflected 
his growing frustration with the lack of communication between 
Congress and the Administration. 
In truth, Fulbright's frustration began with the Eisenhower 
Administration during the 1950's. On January 5, 1957, the 
AdministrationintroducedJoint Resolution 19 which authorized 
the President to employ the Armed Forces at any time to protect 
the nations of the Middle East from international communism. 
Fulbright vehemently opposed this resolution because it granted 
unprecedented freedom to the Executive Branch with regards to 
foreign policy. As debate continued, Fulbright delivered an 
impassioned speech against the resolution, calling it a "blank 
check."4 The speech marked the beginning of Fulbright's public 
campaign against the American policy on the Middle East. 
However, the Administration implored Congress not to deny the 
President the ability to protect American national security. On 
March5, 1957,JointResolution 19-the Eisenhower Doctrine-
passed. In the next two years the Doctrine was applied to three 
separate crises in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The quick 
succession of these events over a two-year period, without the 
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consent of Congress, fostered an unprecedented sense of instability 
and marked a turning point in the history of the Senator's 
involvement in the conflict. Each of the crises backfired against 
the United States, increasing Soviet influence in the region, and 
accordingly, Fulbright marked each event with continued criticism 
on the Senate floor. As the Arab-Israeli conflict erupted again in 
1970, Fulbright resumed his condemnation of unchecked 
Executive power. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
moved to revoke the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Gulf of 
Tonkin Resolution-which allowed Johnson to intervene in 
Vietnam-as a symbolic statement that Congress should not be 
by-passed in foreign policy making. The revelation of the secret 
attack on Cambodia in May of 1970 only antagonized the feeling 
of distrust that Fulbright had for the Nixon administration, in 
particular. This distrust,in addition to the foreign-policy blunders 
aforementioned, motivated the Senator to offer the Fulbright 
Peace Plan, though he knew it would prove controversial. 
The plan, as previously stated, consisted of both a bilateral 
agreement between the United States and Israel and a multilateral 
agreement through the United Nations. According to the Senator's 
reasoning, each piece was necessary to a peaceful solution in the 
Middle East. The bilateral agreement addressed what Fulbright 
considered to be the root of the conflict-Israeli insecurity. He 
believed that if Israel's statehood were protected, it would 
relinquish the conquered territories of the 1967 War. The 
multilateral agreement would ensure Soviet support of the 
proposal, since it would have to be passed by the Security 
Council. Fulbright reasoned that all the Soviets really desired 
was a role in the decision-making process. Furthermore, if the 
United Nations was entrusted to secure peace in the region, its 
reputation could be revived-a reputation that had suffered from 
several unenforceable resolutions such as Resolution 242 which 
ended the 1967 War and called for Israeli withdraw from the 
occupied Arab territories. Thus, the proposal serves as a clear 
example of Fulbright's characteristic methodology-his unique 
way of proceeding-whereby the microscopic focus on a specific 
problem (the crises in the Middle East) is seen within the realm 
of a macroscopic goal (the renovation of the United Nations and 
the sustained balance of power of the Cold War); such a process 
of thought belongs recognizably to Fulbright. 
The bevy of articles that appeared after the release of 
"Old Myths and New Realities If' ranged from vehement criticism 
to unprecedented applause. The media focused on two primary 
points of contention-the proposal's feasibility and its 
inconsistency with regard to the Senator's position on Vietnam. 
Critics were correct in their analysis that Israel would not accept 
the proposal. Fulbright ignored the violation of the cease-fire in 
his speech, and in an attempt to offer an even-handed policy, 
Fulbright alienated Israel with his considerate treatment of the 
Soviets. Other journalists called the Senator a hypocrite for 
denouncing American involvement in Vietnam, yet offering 
American troops to protect Israel. However, Fulbright's 
supporters in the media proclaimed him to be 'The Signalman 
Senator" who examined each foreign policy situation in its own 
right, without the influence of the Jewish lobby.5 Syndicated 
columnist Walter Lippmann noted Fulbright's prophetic status, 
stating that "it has been said of him [Fulbright] that all too often 
he was right too soon."6 Indeed, as the Arab-Israeli conflict 
continues to claim lives today, Fulbright's proposal was reiterated 
in his own speeches, as well as in the Brookings Report on the 
Middle East and the American-Soviet Joint Resolution on Peace 
in the Middle East. 
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Faculty Comments: 
Faculty Mentor Sidney Burris comments: 
First of all, Ms. Maxwellhasidentifiedanaspectofthe 
Senator's career that still generates much 
discussion-his opinion on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
And she has chosen to analyze one of the central 
documents that delves into this opinion-his speech, 
entitled "Old Myths and New Realities II: The Middle 
East." There is focus to her project; and, yet as she 
situates the speech within the long history of American 
relations with the Middle East, there is ample scope as 
well. The thesis itself, for which the current manuscript 
is essentially a precis, runs over fifty pages. In 
reconstructing the background of the speech, Ms. 
Maxwell has educated herself in the making of a 
historical narrative, and she has adroitly handled the 
chronological intricacies, the give-and-take of 
diplomatic negotiations, that characterized this 
particular segment of American history. Her work is 
important because it brings the Byzantine complexity 
of our Middle East negotiations to bear on the equally 
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complex structure of thought that lies behind the 
Senator's speech and so provides a helpful bridge 
between the informing history and the resulting 
speech-and this had not previously been done with 
the same detailed focus that characterizes her 
approach. 
Second, her work has admirably accomplished one of 
the primary goals that the Honors Program originally 
envisioned with the required Honors thesis-Ms. 
Maxwell has plunged herself into the rigors of 
scholarly research; and, as a glance through her 
bibliography will show, she has consulted an array of 
primary sources, including the Fulbright manuscripts 
in our collection, the Congressional Record in 
Washington, D.C., interviews with three of the 
Senator's aides, writers, and press secretaries (Tillman, 
Williams, and Purvis), as well as the standard 
secondary sources. And she has carefully collated the 
material, sifting through the contradictory accounts, 
and gradually built the coherent picture that 
characterizes both this project and her thesis from 
which this project is drawn. She has quite quickly 
learned the necessity of making accurate historical 
judgments based on the available evidence, and her 
approach in each instance has been conservative-no 
conclusions are drawn where they are not clearly 
warranted by the material at hand. My training, of 
course, is in English; and, to direct this thesis and to 
keep pace with Ms. Maxwell, I have had to do much 
of the reading that she did, and I can attest to the 
mountain of information that she has read and 
digested. It is not that the analysis of a single speech 
shows extraordinary ambition; it is that the large 
volume of information that she consulted in reference 
to the single speechrevealsher characteristic ambition 
to leave no stone untumed. As a researcher, she has 
been absolutely thorough and uncompromising in 
her use of sources. 
Finally, I would point to the quality of her prose. As 
the project has progressed through successive drafts, 
she has moved closer and closer to achieving the kind 
of limpid style thatitseems to me most befits historical 
narrative of this sort. Never self-<:onscious, her prose 
has become more and more adept at deftly handling 
the date-driven narrative that often characterizes 
diplomatic history. She has worked hard to effect a 
balance between chronological accuracy and narrative 
liveliness. And in my opinion she has largely 
succeeded-the achievement of a prose style, which is 
already well within her grasp, is another of this 
project's accomplishments. 
Hoyt Purvis, Director of the Fulbright Institute of Intema-
tional Relations says of the work: 
By any measure Ms. Maxwell's study is exceptionally 
fine and accomplished work, and for an undergraduate 
student it represents an extraordinary contribution. 
Ms. Maxwell has studied and analyzed an important 
but relatively unexamined chapter in Senator 
Fulbright's history as a leading figure in American 
foreign policy and international relations. In the 
process she offers some valuable insight into 
Fulbright's views, his mode of operation, his strategy 
for attempting to influence the debate on U.S. policy 
in the Middle East, his efforts to use the media, and his 
relations with the Nixon Administration. 
The historical context, background, and overall 
perspective of American foreign policy of the era is an 
especially strong feature of her work. She displays a 
clear understanding of what was important in the 
development of U.S. policy in the region and of 
Fulbaght's role. Her analysis and her interpretation 
are solid, well-founded, and persuasive. 
Altogether she has done a highly impressive job of 
research and writing. Her mastery of the background 
and context is clear. Her research in the Fulbright 
Papers, as well as the interviews she conducted with 
Seth Tillman and Lee Williams, brings an especially 
valuable dimension to the work. 
As a professor of international relations and as one 
who was involved in working with Senator Fulbright 
at the time of his 1970 speech, I find this to be a 
sophisticated, well-written, and insightful work of 
scholarship. It is clearly worthy of honor. 
Fulbright scholar, Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy, 
and Dean of Fulbright College, Randall B. Woods, re-
marks: 
I am writing to endorse, with great enthusiasm, Ms. 
Maxwell's project, "Old Myths and New Realities: 
Uncovering the Implications of Senator J. William 
Fulbright's 1970 Peace Plan for the Middle East." I 
have spoken with her at some length about it, and her 
conception of the senator's fundamental philosophy 
regarding the United States' relation with Israel and 
the Middle East is both sound and penetrating. By 
examining the senator's proposal to send American 
troops into Israel in exchange for the resumption of 
their original pre-1967borders-the senator proposed 
this while he advocated withdrawing troops from 
Vietnam-Ms. J.l.1axwellhas isolated a sterling example 
of Fulbright's special brand of pragmatism. 
Conformity to historical precedent and consistency 
with an intellectual tradition, while they are worthy 
concerns for a history professor, can yield disastrous 
results in foreign policy. But the fact stubbornly 
remains that many of Fulbright's critics have 
heretofore missed this fundamental point. Senator 
Fulbright, however, did not, and Ms. Maxwell's 
project, while surgically directed toward a specific 
phase in the senator's career, will shed light on his 
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entire political philosophy. And it will correct what 
has become over the years a substantial misconception 
concerning a vital area of his thinking on international 
relations. In my judgment, it is a project of real 
importance that deserves publication. 
The research that she has already completed reveals 
thekindofmaturityseldomseeninanundergraduate. 
Last spring, before she left campus for the summer, 
she introduced herself to the Fulbright archivist in 
MullinsUbrary,obtainedthecredentialsnecessaryto 
work with the manuscript collection, and became 
acquainted with the collection's basic layout-and she 
did this several months in anticipation of the project's 
beginning stages. She has now mastered the navigation 
of the collection. And, while she was in Washington 
this past summer, she began reading the relevant 
speeches in the Ubrary of Congress. She returned to 
Washington during spring break to interview both 
Dr. Seth Tillman, Fulbright's ghostwriter, and Lee 
Williams, Fulbright's former Chief-of-Staff. I cannot 
honestly say that I know of a more disciplined and 
motivated scholar at the undergraduate level than 
Ms. Maxwell, particularly in a field where the sources 
for her work are so voluminous and unwieldy. Many 
older, more seasoned scholars would be overwhelmed 
by the sheer amount of material that is available, but 
Ms. Maxwell has gone through the relevant material 
with purpose and dedication. Perhaps even more 
impressive,however, than this substantial preparation 
is Ms. Maxwell's knowledge of Arabic. She will be 
able to consult a range of primary materials that 
previous Fulbright scholars, becauseoftheirignorance 
of the language, have been unable to examine. This 
knowledge of Arabic alone gives Ms. Maxwell a clear 
advantage over many of the reputable scholars who 
are currently working on Fulbright, and I eagerly 
anticipate the results of her research into this fertile 
area. 
Since her junior year, Ms. Max\vellhas won a Truman 
Fellowship, the FulbrightCollege Prize for Distinction 
in the Liberal Arts, and The Johns Hopkins Essay 
Contest. Most recently, she was appointed to the 
USA-Today Academic All-American Second Team, 
and in December of 1999 she was awarded a 
SILO-SURF grant to complete her work on Fulbright, 
an indication of the overall merit of her project. 
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